On Warfare, my version I

I will be writing a few posts on warfare. My view is not historical, not even war historical, though I will look at certain historical events. It is also not strategic, operational or tactical as I do not have the background for that. I studied this topic for the purpose of gaining some insight to the role of technology in military matters, but my view is not technical, which is the reason why I did not write anything of these issues during the time I worked in military technology. After studying some historical events I begun to see them in what may be called conspiratorial light, and such views you do not want to express while still in the work life. I wanted to check if there is any basis for conspiratorial explanations for somewhat recent history before writing anything, but now, as I already started this blog I may as well write down something. These my thoughts, from so long time ago, may be a bit confusing, or even confused, and not in the best logical order, but these posts are not for publication in scientific forums. Efforts to publish conspiratorial views are quite futile and self-defeating: if they were published it would partially invalidate the conspiratorial position.

            Fine, that is understood, and I do not decorate these posts with references as respectable references are not from the point of view I defend here. So I start with one minor historical event from a very important time.    

            In 1870 Napoleon III surrendered in Sedan and wrote a message to William I of Prussia, the leader of German troops: “Monsieur, dear Brother. As I did not succeed in dying among my soldiers I can only cede my sword to Your Majesty’s hands, Your Majesty’s Dear Brother”, or so claims the book “Turning the tide of the war”. Napoleon III was not William’s brother, but William I was indeed a Brother: he was one of the best known members of the German Grand Lodge. Napoleon III was a Carbonari in his youth and raised to the power by Masons in 1948: the Dialogue by Maurice Joly, so close to the Protocols of the Elders of Sion, very clearly describes the plans of the Mizraim Lodge, the power behind Napoleon III.

            The Battle of Sedan in 1870 was an interesting battle from a military point of view. The French started the war against Prussia and lost it in Sedan, but Bismarck provoked Napoleon to attack. French cavalry charged many times against artillery, and understandably failed, but Sedan was mainly an artillery battle where the German artillery had a longer range than the French artillery. Emile Zola took part in the battle and he explained that French ammunition had detonators which exploded in the air when the French artillery tried to shoot longer range. Napoleon III was so shocked by this battle that his last words – he died in 1873 – were: “Were you in Sedan?”

            I hope you have read Maurice Joly’s Dialogies, or at least my post “Who Wrote the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, When and Why?” Then you should understand that the  that lifted Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte to precidency in 1848 were Freemasons and the power behind him, the Machiavelli of Joly’s book, was the Mizraim Lodge. These revolutionary Masons were the planners of almost all revolutions from the American Revolutionary War of 1776 to the Paris Commune of 1871. After that time Masons did not act so openly in Europe. You many check what they did in Latin America, for instance in Mexico during the Calles government, to deduce that they were still active in the beginning of the 20th century and that they had a close connection to another well known secret power. Freemasons created Zionism, which is easy to show by checking for instance the names Adolphe Cremieux and Mordecai Manuel Noah, though origilally the idea of restoring Jews to Palestine is from British Protestants. But this idea appealed to Kabbalists and the Mizraim Lodge was Kabbalistic. The lodge does not exist anymore, Mizraim-Memphis is not revolutionary.

            So, what happened in the Battle of Sedan? By defeating France, after having defeated Austria, Prussia become the leading nation of Germany and it unified Germany paving the way to the two world wars.       

            The time when Freemasons arranged revolutions was a particular period in the history when a relatively untrained mass army could defeat a professional army, provided that it had a charismatic leades, such as Napoleon I. Napoleon III tried to be similar, but was never so charismatic. During this short period, some 70 years, Freemasons started revolutions and wars including the American Revolutionary War, the French Great Revolution, the First Division of Poland (in my opinion it is so, with the help of Frankists), revolutions of 1848, and lots of independence wars in European colonies. During this time battles were fought with muskets which were fired in volley. In the previous century soldiers had to be professionals as the weapons used, swords, lances, required skill and practise, but in the end of the 18th century infantry had muskets and bayonets and there was cavalry and artillery. The muskets were unaccurate and could not be loaded fast enough, therefore a cavalry charge was very effective and a large infantry attack could reach the defending line before being shot to death. This time passed when magasine rifles and machine guns were invented and artillery improved. It is not by coincidence that open revolutionary Freemasory stopped to the Paris Commune in Western and Central Europe: Communists still tried the mass attack against modern guns later, but with very heavy losses. 

            The Battle of Sedan still belonged to the time of Freemasons. If Napoleon III indeed used the word Brother when addressing William I, he meant Masonic Brother.

            The change in warfare was visible already in the Crimean War. Battles froze to trench warfare. British ulans tried a cavalry charge in the Battle of Balaclava 1854, artillery stopped it. The same happened to General Lee in Gettysburg in 1863. In Gettysburg Confederate infantry attacked against magasine rifles and Gatlung guns but was unttack able to reach the defence lines. Trench warfare situations developed also in the Russo-Japan war of 1905. Later they characterized the whole Western Front of the First World War. These trench battles were attrition war where neither side could win by attacking.

            Based on this background the Battle of Sedan in 1870 should have become a trench battle, but Prussians had superior artillery. Naturally, as a former researcher of military technology I should interprete this as a demonstration of the importance of technology in military affairs. It is clear that technology has a major role, just think of the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 where the British with machine guns and magasine rifles defeated Mahdi’s large army equipped with swords and lances, or the Operation Desert Shield in Iraq in 1991 when Americans with very small own losses defeated Sadam Hussain’s almost equally large army equipped with outdated weapons. But these are exceptions in military history and mostly apply to modern armies fighting against an inferior opponent. Clausewitz wrote that technics does not matter in warfare (in the European theatre) because both sides use similar technics. That is how it normally should have been: there was the arms race and each nation had to keep up with technical development. I agree with this: even small natios, which do not have the resources to develop expensive weapon systems, try to invent tactical or technical ways to counter the threats of the opponent’s new weapons. What happened in Sedan was a failure of French intelligence: Germans must have known the range of the French artillery for Bismarck to provoke the French to attack, but French did not know enough of German artillery. Prussia used Krupp C64 steel cast gun with 3.4 km range. In 1870 the French took to service the Reffye 85 mm cannon but many units still had the older La Hitte artillery. These French field guns did indeed have a much shorter range than Krupp C64. The French also had Reffye’s mitrailleuse, an early machine gun.

            But I consider this to be an intelligence failure from the French side. Many armies used Krupp’s steel cast guns at that time, steel cast was no secret. The French 75 of 1897 is considered the first modern gun, so the French were not behind in artillery design.

            Be how it is, possibly the French did not yet understand the importance of intelligence and the Germans did not get their information by spying in 1870, but a bit later there was the Deyfus affair of 1894. The affair was framed as an antisemitic event, but it actually was of Germany spying on French artillery design. The most secret project was the development of the French 75 of 1897, but the Deyfus affair concerned a note that a French spy found from German hands telling that information of a French 120 caliber artillery piece was forthcoming. Thus, very clearly, there was a German spy in the French army.

            Today Alfred Dreyfus is declared innocent and Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy is decleared the real German spy in this affair. However, at that time Esterhazy was protected by the French High Command, tried and announced nonguilty. Apparently some people in the French army were quite convinced that Dreyfus was the spy. The proofs against Dreyfus were not especially binding, but there is a special issue with military secrets: you have to have a permission to the secrets and sign if you want some information, so the army should know how could have had access to the information. Esterhazy was acting as a spy of Germans, but judging from the protection he was given, it is more likely that he was one of the disinformation agents France used to mislead the Germans. Such disinformation operations are known from the development of the French 75 and in the First World War in the Battle of Marne the Germans were surprised to see the performance of the French 75. That was called the miracle of Marne: the German attack was stopped and the war turned into trench warfare as was to be expected. That is, unless the attacking Germany had good intelligence on French weapons as they probably had in 1870. About the Dreyfus affair not much more need to be said than that only two people, Dreyfus and Esterhazy, have been proposed as the German spy. If there were other candidates, they should be identified. The French High Command surely did not make an antisemitic campaign against a Jew in a matter when Germany was spying their artillery secrets, especially after Sedan. They tried to catch the spy. 

            Dreyfus was Jewish, but that is not the real issue. The real issue is that since the American Revolutionary War there was the Freemason conspiracy, and we can call it Judeo-Masonic conspiracy, or Masonic-Zionist conspiracy, or Masonic-bankers conspiracy. It is not properly called the international Jewish conspiracy if by Jews is meant an ethnic group or adherants of a religion. In 1890s there already was the Communist conspiracy, which can also be called the Judeo-Communist conspiracy, with the same reservation that Judeo does not refer to Jews as an ethnic group or adherants of Judaism. In both cases the word refers to a small group of bankers, Zionists and revolutionaries and the existence of such a group is verified just as clearly as the existence of revolutionary Masons a bit earlier. The two conspiracies are connected but not the same: Theosophists and Martinists, both from Masonry circles, did warn against the other conspiracy. It was like Dr. Frankenstein with the Monster, Frankenstein, the creator, trying to stop the Monster in the far North, that is, in Russia.

            Sedan is interesting in its own right, but what really changed the world was the First World War. Everybody in the military must have known what the character of the First World War was to be: a cavalry charge could be used only in Eastern Europe where armies were yet rather poorly equipped, an infantry attack was going to cost lots of men and the war would almost certainly freeze to trench warfare.  

            And there were trench battles of Verdun, Somme and Ypres. Why was the war started at all? If the purpose of Germany was to win by attrition war, then it was obviously mistaken, despite of what Niall Ferguson wrote in The Pity of War. Even though the central powers were more efficient in killing, the side that would most probably lose attrition war were the central powers as they had a much smaller population. Yet, Germany did not lose because of running out of men. It did so in the Second World War, but not in the First. German losses were 6.86 million: 2 million dead, 0.6 million prisoners and 4.2 million wounded. Germany had the population of 70 million, so the losses were 10% of the population. It may look like Germany had run out of men, but this is not correct: it originally had the theoretical reserve of 19.8 million men. The size of the German army and reserve in 1914 was 4.5 million and in the war Germany mobilized 11 million, so in 1918 it still had 3 million men mobilized and in arms and could mobilize more reserves. The new 688,000 conscripts of 1918 fully covered the 380,000 who died in 1918. What broke Germany was the fighting morale: some 340,000 German soldiers surrendered in the end of the war.

            That is, the goal of an attrition war was not realistic.     

            Let’s make a small calculation. Since the French Revolution of 1789 European countries used conscript armies up to the end of the 20th century. The size of a conscription army of mid 20th century can be roughly estimated. If the population is, for instance, 5.5 million (as it happens to the present population of Finland) and it grows 1% annually (as European populations grew in the early half of the 20th century) and the life span is around 70 years (as it was back then), there should be about 1.1 million between 0-9 years, 1 million 10-19 years, 0.9 million 20-29 years, 0.82 million 30-39 years, 0.74 million 40-49 years, 0.67 million 50-59 years, 0.5 million 60-69 years, 0.2 million 70-79 years and 0.07 million over 80 years. From these figures it follows that there are 50,000 men of the age 19 taken to the conscript service, which is 0.9% of the population, the men are in the reserve for 40 years, that is, the reserve is nominally 1.56 million men, but naturally all cannot be taken to the army. The war time army from this size population is typically about 0.55 million, which is roughly the number of able bodied men from 19 to 35 years.

            The figures from WWI Germany more or less match with this calculation. The population of Germany was 70 million. The year class in 1918 was 699,000, a bit more than the calculated 630,000, so maybe the population growth was a bit higher. The army size was 4.5 million in 1914 and Germany mobilized 11 million, rather close to the calculated war time army size of 7 million. With a population growth of 1% the war could have lasted any number of years. Germans were getting hungry, but they had made an agreement with Ukraine to provide food from there (although Ukraine may not have had so much food to share) so in 1918 the situation was not entirely hopeless. It would turn out to be worse when the Reds won the Russian civil war, but it was later.

            What happened is that Germans lost the fighting spirit. The same happened in Russia a bit before: since 1916 Brusilov attacked successfully and completely destroyed Austrians, yet the result of these attacks was that Russians lost the fighting moral and started deserting. Communists made a revolution.  

            I do not think the German goal could have been an attrition war. It is possible that they were given misleading intelligence and thought that they would win France easily, as in Sedan. Moltke resigned after the Battle of Marne. The whole war seems to have been a trap to get European countries into a world war. There is a paragraph of this in the Protocols of the Elders of Sion that may remind of what might happen if Turkey would not agree to give Palestine to Zionists, who asked for a homeland.

            I tried to verify if the claims of Freemasons having pre-knowledge of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand were true, and it seems to be so. The First World War turned out to be a war that Masons called the war to end all wars, that is, a crazy war where nobody gains anything and people learn not to have more wars. The war destroyed three monarchies: Russia, Austria and Germany, which agreed with the goals of revolutionary Freemasons, and Kabbalists who saw Christian kings as Edom, to be destroyed in the end of the times.

            Yet, I do not think the war was a Masonic plan, though they probably did assist at the starting of the war. Masons were not the only group desiring a war. The war put European countries, like England, into a very difficult situation where it could be blackmailed with the US card: the USA could be brought to the war at any time, like Japan could be financed to the war against Russia in 1905.

            You understand why I did not write of this in the time I worked in the military. It was not technology that decided the wars. Technology contributed, but there are powers that be.